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There’s an interesting debate in moral and political philosophy about the nature of, and 
relationship between, ideal and non-ideal theory. In this paper we discuss whether an 
analogous distinction can be drawn in philosophy of language. Our conclusion is negative: Even 
if you think that distinction can be put to work within moral and political philosophy, there’s no 
useful way to extend it to work that has been done in the philosophy of language. Here is the 
plan:  
 
● In section 1 we present a sketch of how theorizing in philosophy of language works, so 
that we can highlight the ways in which that theorizing can go wrong.  
● In section 2, we outline four ways in which ideal and non-ideal theory have been 
understood in moral and political philosophy and ask whether any of them can provide 
frameworks to help us pick out interesting subsets of work in philosophy of language. 
We conclude that none of them can.   
● In section 3 we turn to the question of whether the expression ‘social and political 
philosophy of language’ (the title of this volume) can be used to pick out an interesting 
sub-discipline. Again, we conclude that it cannot. 
● In sections 4 we give a diagnosis of why the efforts in sections 2 and 3 fail and draw 
some general lessons from those failures.  
 
Before we get to all that, some context to make clear why this an interesting issue. Some might 
have in mind the following little caricature of philosophy of language: 
 
The philosopher of language sits in his armchair, never venturing into the outside world. 
He thinks of a few sentences, and then starts throwing mathematical machinery at 
those sentences. The result is a theory that handles some tiny fragment of the language 
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(probably mostly mathematical language), giving a bloodless picture of how some 
hypothetical perfectly rational, dispassionate, and cooperative agents might use that 
language to pass back and forth packets of information. 
 
Confronted with this caricature, one might think that philosophy of language has lost track of 
“the real world”. Where is the language of metaphor, hyperbole, propaganda, and threats? 
Where are the liars, the bullshitters, the hucksters, and the rabble-rousers? Someone familiar 
with the debate in moral and political philosophy might think the right way to frame this 
concern is by appeal to the ideal/non-ideal distinction: Have philosophers of language been too 
focused on ideal philosophy of language and ignored non-ideal philosophy language?  
 
We’re going to answer that question in the negative. In the end, we think that philosophy of 
language properly develops theoretical tools by starting with the study of simple cases which in 
fact make up the bulk of ordinary language use, and then systematically extending those 
theoretical tools to cover a wider and wider range of harder and more complicated cases that 
often involve navigating tricky waters where questions about specifically linguistic phenomena 
start to merge into broader questions about overall human behavior.  
 
That’s not to say, of course, that philosophy of language never goes wrong. It does, as all 
theoretical projects do. But we will argue that attempts to import a dispute from normative 
theory about the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory don’t find a distinctive failing 
in philosophy of language to latch onto. There are, for example, many underexplored topics in 
philosophy of language. Philosophers of language have had relatively little to say about the 
persuasive functioning of language in advertisement, and they have had relatively little to say 
about the semantics of prepositions, for example.1 But there is no evidence of any systematic 
patterns in what topics are underexplored. It’s hard, of course, to get any good count of stuff 
we haven’t been paying attention to—but to the extent that looking around is a helpful guide, 
unexplored topics seem to be scattered about at random. 
1. Theory Building: A Partial Sketch   
 
We begin by observing one thing that goes under the name “idealization” that will not yield a 
helpful distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory. Consider a toy sketch of how building a 
theory of language goes. We begin by collecting some data. Data collection is a messy matter. If 
we just go out and start writing down what’s happening as people use language, we’re going to 
get an enormous collection of heterogeneous information. We’ll have details about people’s 
linguistic output; people’s intentions, plans, hopes, fears, desires, and anxieties; people’s 
professions, social status, clothing, financial difficulties, and mathematical proficiency; the 
social conventions governing politeness, greetings and departings, meals, and gift-giving; the 
 1	Others	have	had	much	to	say	about	both	of	these	topics.	People	have	looked,	for	example,	at	how	syntactic	complexity	affects	viewers’	comprehension	and	recall	of	advertisements	(Bradley	and	Meeds	(2002)),	and	there	is	work	about	prepositions	by	semanticists	such	as	Joost	Zwarts	(e.g.	2017)	.	
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specifics of the physical environment including the weather, the local geography, and what 
objects are positioned where. 
 
No theory of language can incorporate all of that data—if it tried, it wouldn’t be a theory, but 
just a data dump. The theorist must extract from the data what look to be interesting patterns, 
and then try to explain those patterns. Doing this involves both deciding what data to keep and 
what data to discard and deciding what categories to use in characterizing the patterns we find 
in the data. All of this can go under the heading of idealizing, although it could just as well be 
called abstracting or simplifying.2  
 
But idealization in this sense is not going to produce a distinction between ideal and non-ideal 
theories. That’s because all theory involves idealization in this sense, so there is no possibility of 
a “non-ideal” theory. To be non-ideal would be not to idealize, and thus not to abstract and 
extract patterns from the data. That wouldn’t be a theory at all. 
 
However, this sense of idealization does have something to do with our opening caricature of a 
philosophy of language that has lost engagement with the real world. When we abstract 
patterns from the data, we make choices about what to pay theoretical attention to. For 
example: 
 
● We have to decide where to get our data (what parts of the total possible data to take 
into account). We could look at data restricted to our own introspective judgments on 
sentence types, or we could look at cross-linguistic field data drawn from language users 
in a variety of social settings. 
● We have to decide what aspects of the data to try to explain. We could focus on the 
parts of the data concerning truth conditions of and inferential relations among 
sentences, or we could focus on the parts of the data that concern the forms of 
emotional, social, and financial manipulation that people are attempting in their 
language use. 
● We have to decide what kinds of patterns to extract from the data. We could 
characterize patterns using categories like rational and cooperative speaker, thus 
perhaps finding a simpler pattern that applies in fewer cases, or we could characterize 
patterns using categories like deceptive and uncooperative speaker, thus perhaps finding 
a more complicated pattern that applies in more cases. 
 
These choices about how to idealize/abstract/simplify our data aren’t choices that will make 
the difference between right and wrong theories. Whichever way we choose to idealize, we will 
(assuming we then do our theory building well) end up with a correct theory. But the choices 
will make a difference in what our theory ends up being about. Idealize in one way, and we end 
 2	Anticipating	some	of	our	discussion	of	the	next	section,	this	form	of	idealization	maps	reasonably	well	onto	what	Mills	calls	building	ideal-as-descriptive	models,	although	we	will	suggest	that	Mills’s	further	distinction	between	ideal-as-descriptive	and	ideal-as-idealization	models	is	not	helpful.	
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up with a theory of cross-sentential anaphora. Idealize in another way, and we end up with a 
theory of the role of presuppositions in creating plausible linguistic deniability. 
 
So while we don’t get, on this picture of idealization, a distinction between ideal and non-ideal 
theory, we do get a distinction between explored and unexplored topics. How we idealize 
shapes what topics we end up theorizing about, and the result is that some topics might end up 
being neglected. 
 
Concerns that important topics are being neglected are legitimate concerns. Work in 
philosophy of language inevitably sometimes doesn’t gather data that it ought to gather (thus 
the increased interest in experimental methods and cross-linguistic work, for example). It 
inevitably sometimes neglects interesting patterns in the data that would have led to 
interesting projects (the curious behavior of ‘or’ in free choice permission claims was neglected 
during decades of work on the semantics of logical vocabulary). And it inevitably sometimes 
provides explanations that restrict the scope of theories unnecessarily (we start by building 
theories that focus on the semantics of declarative sentences, when it turns out that equally 
robust theories could have incorporated the semantic features of interrogative and imperative 
sentences as well).  
 
None of this is meant to be startling news. We don’t always get the right data, ask the right 
questions, or use the right tools in answering the questions we do ask. Hopefully “don’t always” 
falls reasonably far short of “frequently don’t”, and hopefully there are mechanisms in the field 
that help fix the problems when they arise. (Note that the specific instances cited in the 
previous paragraph have more-or-less-satisfactorily been addressed.) But we should always 
have our eye on what topics have been unjustly neglected in the field.  
2. ‘Ideal vs Non-Ideal Theory’   
 
We turn now to the various ways in which the terms ‘ideal’ and ‘non-ideal’ have been used in 
describing theories in moral and political philosophy. In these fields, there is a lively debate 
about how to balance ideal vs non-ideal theory, with many theorists arguing that the alleged 
dominance of ideal theory has had various pernicious consequences. The debates internal to 
moral and political philosophy will not be our concern here. Instead, we will focus on the 
question of whether this distinction and the accompanying debate can be applied to philosophy 
of language and communication. Is there a distinction between ideal and non-ideal philosophy 
of language? If yes, has ideal theory dominated? And has that had negative consequences?   
 
To answer these questions, we first need to understand the distinction as it has been drawn in 
moral and political philosophy. As with most kinds of fashionable jargon, we find that the 
terminology is used in many conflicting ways. That in itself is a serious problem (and a strong 
prima facie reason for avoiding the spread of the terminology to other fields). In what follows 
we outline some of the uses of these terms in moral and political philosophy and the reasons 
why they don’t illuminate anything useful about work done in philosophy of language. The 
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conclusion will be this: no version of the ideal/non-ideal distinction terminology helps delineate 
anything important about linguistic theorizing. There are no good reasons to let that piece of 
confused terminology spread to philosophy of language.  
 
Before we turn to the use of ‘[non]ideal theory’ in moral and political philosophy, let’s 
reemphasize one central point made in the first section and give it a name: 
 
Underexplored: In any field, there will always be topics that are under-explored. 
However, to say that you don’t need to import terminology from a contentious debate 
in moral and political philosophy. You just say: this topic is underexplored.    
 
Below, we’ll argue that a lot of what people aim to capture with the ideal/ non-ideal distinction 
is unimportant or incoherent, and we suggest that the remaining sensible parts reduce to 
various instances of Underexplored.    
 
Use 1: Full-Compliance vs Partial-Compliance (Rawls) 
 
Much of the terminological confusions surrounding ‘ideal/non-ideal theory’ can be traced back 
to the political philosopher John Rawls. In his book A Theory of Justice, Rawls uses these terms 
to mark two very different distinctions. The first distinction is between theories that assume full 
compliance with the demands of justice and those that don’t make that assumption.3  
 
Our question is whether this distinction is usefully applied to work in philosophy of language. 
First note the most obvious discrepancy: semantic, syntactic and pragmatic theories are not 
theories of justice and so there’s no distinction there between those semantic, syntactic, or 
pragmatic theories that assume full compliance with the demands of justice and those that 
don’t. Whether people are in full or partial compliance with the demands of justice in Rawls’s 
sense is just irrelevant.  
 
To make the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory useful when thinking about 
philosophy of language, we would need move away from how Rawls uses those terms. We have 
to find a substitute for ‘compliance with the demands of justice’ that’s relevant to the study of 
language. It’s entirely non-trivial to come up with that. Here a possibility: A theory of meaning 
will make assumptions about how speakers behave and what semantic and pragmatic rules 
they follow. Maybe the analogue of Rawls’s ‘full compliance’ is the assumption that everyone 
always follows all these rules fully. But the details of this is extremely hard to work out: 
‘salmon’ denotes salmons in English. Is ‘full compliance’ then to be understood as the claim that 
all English speakers always use ‘salmon’ to denote salmon? Are all English speakers in full 
 3	Stemplowska	and	Swift	points	out	that	Rawls	gives	the	impression	that	the	distinction	between	ideal	and	non-ideal	theory	simply	reduces	to	a	whether	a	theory	assumes	strict	or	only	partial	compliance:	“Thus,	he	speaks	of	“[i]deal,	or	strict	compliance,	theory...”	(2001:	13)	and,	even	more	strikingly,	introduces	the	concept	of	ideal	theory	for	the	first	time	exclusively	with	reference	to	the	problem	of	compliance	(1999a:	7-8).”	
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compliance with the rigidity of proper names? Insofar as these questions make sense at all, the 
answers are not useful for dividing up work done in philosophy of language We have debates of 
about whether there are natural languages or just micro languages, how much of language is 
context sensitive, how context sensitivity works, etc. Adding the ‘ideal/ non-ideal’ distinction 
will do nothing to illuminate or move those debates forward5.  
 
Maybe the more plausible illustration would be variations on Grice’s cooperative principles. 
Grice says:  
 
We might then formulate a rough general principle which participants will be expected 
(ceteris paribus) to observe, namely: Make your conversational contribution such as is 
required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk 
exchange in which you are engaged. One might label this the Cooperative Principle. 
(1975: 45) 
 
Now we could create an analogue of Rawls’ principle as follows:  
 
Griceans assume full compliance with the demands of the cooperative principle. Hence 
they’re doing ideal philosophy of language.  
 
The problem with this way of extending the terminology is that there’s no one in the Gricean 
tradition who ever assumed full compliance with this or related principles. One of the core 
points of Gricean pragmatics is that people both flout and violate these maxims all the time. No 
one in the Gricean tradition thought that there were no liars or that people don’t use language 
for deceptive and evil ends. Griceans try to describe what happens when speakers follow the 
cooperative principle and they think some people sometimes do that. The Gricean also predict 
that if we’re in a situation in which it’s known that speakers are being uncooperative, a lot of 
the usual implicatures will go away. And in fact this seems right. (Scalar implicatures, for 
example, can go away in confrontational courtroom situations.) So the Gricean not only doesn’t 
assume that the normative principle is always being followed—they actually have a theory that 
says the right thing about cases in which the normative principle isn’t being followed.  
 
More generally, if we take ‘full compliance’ to mean that we’re theorizing only about people 
with certain (desirable) features—people who are acting well, following the rules, being 
cooperative, knowing the meanings of words, etc., then (a) it’s not clear what the “desirable” 
features are in the linguistic case6 and (b) the theories aren’t assuming that everyone has the 
desirable features. Minimally they’re saying what happens when language is used by people 
with the desirable features. More expansively, they might predict that when language is used 
by people without those features, some of those things don’t happen (as with the implicatures). 
 5	We	also	have	the	performance/competence	distinction;	thus	we	have	compliance	at	the	level	of	performance	(something	we	never	achieve,	even	for	idiolects)	and	at	the	level	of	competence.		6		Is	it	“desirable”	to	apply	a	word	only	to	things	described	by	its	satisfaction	conditions,	so	that	metaphorical	speakers	are	acting	undesirably?	
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Or they might say that when language is used by people without those features, there are no 
systematic consequences to characterize. 
 
Now you might think that’s all well and good, but also think that not enough effort has been 
spent exploring what happens when people aren’t in full compliance. While it might be true 
that Grice has something to say about non-cooperative behavior, maybe he and the tradition 
after him didn’t focus enough on, say, lying, misleading, bullshitting or various other 
manipulative uses of language. Below we will show that this complaint is unfounded, but let’s 
grant it for the sake of argument. Note that what we then have is an instance of 
Underexplored. We have already established that in order to make Underexplored complaints,  
we don’t need the ideal/non-ideal terminology.7   
 
Use 2: Ideal Theory Assumes Favourable Circumstances (Rawls)  
 
The second way in which Rawls uses the ideal/non-ideal distinction is to contrast theories of 
justice that assume that the natural and historical conditions are favourable with those that 
don’t. According to Rawls, the conditions are favourable if the economic and social conditions 
are sufficiently developed to realize justice.  
 
Again, the political version of this doesn’t apply in any immediate way to work in philosophy of 
language. Consider the claim that proper names are rigid designators. That claim makes no 
assumptions about justice at all. We would need a broader sense of ‘favourable’. Maybe the 
relevant distinction would be between theories that assume ‘favourable linguistic conditions’ 
and those that don’t (where the former are Ideal Philosophy of Language and the latter Non-
Ideal). Does Kripke assume that linguistic conditions are favourable for achieving rigidity? For 
much the same reasons we gave in the previous section, it’s hard to know what that question 
means. If proper names are rigid, then, yes, in some sense the linguistic conditions are 
favourable towards rigidity. Again, that’s just to say that names are rigid and so the world is 
such that it makes proper names rigid. To contrast theories that assume ‘favourable’ conditions 
with those that don’t is just to contrast theories that accept rigidity and those that don’t.  
 
As in the case of the ‘full compliance’ reading of ‘ideal’, one might suspect that the Gricean 
principles of cooperation are better candidates for spelling out some linguistic analogue of 
‘favourable’ conditions. Does the Gricean tradition (with its focus on e.g., the Cooperative 
Principle) assume favourable linguistic conditions? Well, Grice thinks that actual people often 
cooperate in conversations and he has a theory of what happens when they do and what 
happens when they don’t. That’s just to say that he thinks he gives a correct description of the 
activity some speakers engage in some of the time. Of course, for activity A to take place, the 
world has to be such that A can take place in it. It is hard to see that an appeal to ‘favourable 
 7	Note	that	the	explored-underexplored	distinction	doesn’t	even	map	accidentally	onto	the	ideal/non-ideal	distinction:	free	choice	permission	in	ability	modals	is	underexplored—that’s	got	no	connection	with	how	‘ideal’	anyone	or	anything	is.		
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conditions’ will do much to illuminate that work or help to contrast it with an alternative, non-
ideal philosophy of language. The non-favourable conditions would be when people violate or 
flout the maxims, but that is something Grice talks extensively about. Again, maybe there some 
kinds of non-cooperation (e.g., Frankfurtian bullshitting) that are underexplored, but that’s just 
an instance of Underexplored—not something we need a new distinction to characterize.  
 
Here is another illustration of why assumptions about ‘favourable conditions’ aren’t useful for 
characterizing work in philosophy of language. Imagine someone noticing that Grice and others 
who theorize about communication never talk about how much noise there is in the real world. 
In the examples Griceans discuss, speakers are never next to jackhammers or other things that 
disrupt communication. Griceans tend to just ignore noise levels. Now ask: is that a sense in 
which the Gricean tradition in philosophy of language has been assuming ‘favourable’ 
conditions (without even mentioning it)? Are they involved in theorizing that idealizes away 
from the real world (filled as it is with noise)? Is that a sense in which we can say that 
philosophy of language is ideal theory and that we could introduce a non-ideal theory that’s 
more sensitive to auditory interference (and illegible handwriting etc.)? Surely the answer here 
is no. That would just be silly. Names are still rigid even when spoken next to jackhammers. 
Speakers try to generate implicatures in noisy rooms, it’s just that they sometimes fail because 
they can’t hear each other. Then there is another theory—the theory of auditory perception—
that will explain when people can hear each other and when they cannot. That turns out to be a 
good division of labor because those with expertise in syntax, semantics and pragmatics don’t 
know very much about ears and jackhammers. In sum: We don’t need the distinction between 
ideal and non-ideal theory to explain why we abstract from noise levels. This second Rawlsian 
way of distinguishing between ideal and non-ideal theory doesn’t apply in any interesting way 
to work in philosophy of language.  
 
Use 3: Utopian vs. (More or Less) Realistic Theory (Valentini)  
 
Laura Valentini (2012) articulates a third use of  ‘ideal vs non-ideal theory’ (albeit it one very 
close to Use 2 above). She says that it is sometimes is used to distinguish: 
  
… the types of feasibility constraints we might take into account when designing 
normative principles. ... First, we need to distinguish between ‘fully utopian’ theories, 
which altogether reject the need to place feasibility constraints on principles of justice, 
and ‘realistic’ theories, which accept some such constraints. Second, among the latter 
group of theories, we need to distinguish between more or less realistic ones, 
depending on what kinds of real-world constraints they factor into the design of 
normative principles. (2012: 656-7) 
 
Valentini uses G. A. Cohen to illustrate the Utopian view according to which justice is ‘timeless 
(fact-free) value, perhaps akin to a Platonic ideal.’ (2012: 657) Whether we can achieve it or not 
is irrelevant and figuring out what justice is, won’t tell us what to do to get there, according to 
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Cohen. What would be the linguistic analogue of this kind of ideal theory? What would be a 
linguistic utopia? It would have to be a theory that doesn’t place ‘feasibility constraints’ on a 
theory of meaning and communication. But no such theory has ever been proposed, so it’s a 
pointless category. No philosopher of language has tried to describe an ideal language 
unconstrained by any facts about how people can use such a language. The various theories 
that spring out the kind of process described in section 1 are all constrained by facts about real 
languages and their speakers. Even theorists who constructed improved languages (e.g., Frege 
and Carnap) did it in order to help people—real people—think and reason better.  
 
Turning to the distinction between the more or less realistic theories, it is also hard to see how 
that adds anything to what we already have in section 1. Theories of the meaning and effects of 
utterances are constrained by whatever factors the theorist choose to include. She will always 
abstract from some features of the real world (that is in the nature of theorizing) and focus on 
some at the expense of others (again, that’s in the nature of theorizing). As above, we don’t 
need the ‘ideal/non-ideal theory’ distinction to point that out.   
Use 4: Idealized Models: “an ideal—in the sense of an exemplar—model of how P should 
work” (Mills)  
 
The final attempt to distinguish ideal from non-ideal theory comes from an influential paper by 
Charles Mills (2005). He distinguishes between two ways of constructing models to describe the 
behaviour of a given phenomenon P:  
 
Ideal-descriptive models. Such models purport to be descriptive of P’s crucial aspects (its 
essential nature) and how it actually works (its basic dynamics). An ideal-descriptive 
model has to abstract away from certain features of P: one will make simplifying 
assumptions, based on what one takes the most important features of P to be, and 
include certain features while omitting others.  
 
Ideal-idealized models: such models provide an exemplar of what an ideal P should be 
like. The “should” here will in general not necessarily be a moral “should,” but may 
involve norms of a technical functionalist kind (an ideal vacuum cleaner, an ideal factory 
farm, an ideal digestive system, and so on) or just limiting assumptions convenient for 
the purposes of mathematization and calculation (an ideal gas, a perfect vacuum, a 
frictionless plane, a resistance-free conductor).  
 
Is this distinction useful for categorizing work in philosophy of language? First, we should give 
Mills credit for trying to articulate a more general distinction—it’s not meant to be applicable 
just to work in moral and political philosophy. As a result, this is potentially more directly 
applicable to, for example, philosophy of language. That said, we also think that the attempted 
generalization is problematic because the distinction between the two kinds of theorizing is 
unclear. Here is what we have in mind: Ideal-descriptive models abstract away from various 
features of the world. Which features? In order to not be a sub-set of ideal-ideal-models, these 
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features must not be delineated in the broad sense of ‘ideal’ or ‘normative’ that is 
characteristic of the ideal-ideal models. It is hard to see how to avoid that (i.e., it is hard to 
avoid appealing to something normative when picking out the features that ideal-descriptive 
theories abstract away from). If we start classifying properties of, say, vacuum cleaners, as 
important and not so important (as we are doing in an ideal-descriptive model), the natural way 
to do that is to think about what’s required for a well-functioning vacuum cleaner. The natural 
thought is to proceed as follows:  
We abstract away from lots of the deficiencies that plague most vacuum cleaners. The 
ideal-descriptive model of a vacuum cleaner will exclude those that have got gum stuck 
inside because they are defective. For the same reason, they will exclude those that are 
cracked or have any number of potential defects that are found in real world vacuum 
cleaners. Abstraction is typically towards non-defective, non-functioning exemplars.  
That, however, but that can’t be right because we are then introducing the normative 
component that’s supposed to be distinctive of the ideal-ideal models (and distinguish those 
from the ideal-descriptive models). The challenge, therefore, is to make systematic sense of the 
form of abstraction involved in ideal-descriptive models, without appeal to the broad sense of 
`should` the ideal-descriptive models involve. We are not claiming this cannot be done, but if it 
is done, we suspect there are very few real cases left of pure ideal-descriptive models: it’s an 
abstraction with few real instantiations. That’s our first concern with Mills picture, but it won’t 
play a central role in what follows.  
 
Mills goes on to argue that in moral and political philosophy, ideal-idealized models are deeply 
problematic. In what follows, we’ll spend a bit of time outlining the arguments that Mills gives 
for this. We do that because we suspect some readers are inclined to reason as follows: Mills is 
right about the bad effects of ideal theory in moral and political philosophy and ‘idealized 
philosophy of language’ is problematic for some of the same reasons. Our conclusion will be as 
before: it’s pointless to classify philosophy of language as ideal or non-ideal in this sense, and 
there’s nothing problematic here.  
 
The problem, according to Mills, with ideal-idealized models is, “...the exploration of the ideal 
as an end in itself without ever turning to the question of what is morally required in the 
context of the radically deviant non-ideal actuality” (Pateman and Mills 2007: 118). Mills says:  
 
If we start from what is presumably the uncontroversial premise that the ultimate point 
of ethics is to guide our actions and make ourselves better people and the world a 
better place, then the framework above will not only be unhelpful, but will in certain 
respects be deeply antithetical to the proper goal of theoretical ethics as an enterprise. 
In modeling humans, human capacities, human interaction, human institutions, and 
human society on ideal-as-idealized-models, in never exploring how deeply different 
this is from ideal-as-descriptive-models, we are abstracting away from realities crucial to 
our comprehension of the actual workings of injustice in human interactions and social 
institutions, and thereby guaranteeing that the ideal-as-idealized-model will never be 
achieved. (2005:170) 
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Okay, back to philosophy of language. Let’s try to mimic Mills’s rhetorical flourishes applying 
them to theories of meaning and communication. You might try the following: 
  
If we start from what is presumably the uncontroversial premise that the ultimate point 
of philosophy of language and communication is to guide our speech and make 
ourselves better speakers, then the ideal-idealized philosophy of language will not only 
be unhelpful, but will in certain respects be deeply antithetical to the proper goal of 
philosophy of language as an enterprise. In modeling human speech on ideal-as-
idealized-models and in never exploring how deeply different this is from ideal-as-
descriptive-models, we are abstracting away from realities crucial to our comprehension 
of the actual workings of speech and communication and thereby guaranteeing that the 
ideal-as-idealized-model will never be achieved. 
 
This type of argument is deeply flawed. First, the goal of philosophy of language is not to make 
us better speakers or communicators.8 That much is, we take it, common ground here. Second, 
as we have seen, philosophers of language have not presented ideal-idealized models of how 
language ought to be. They’ve tried to describe how languages actually are and how speakers 
actually behave. In so doing they by necessity abstract from certain feature of real speakers, 
but that’s essential to all theorizing (as Mills recognizes). Russell doesn’t say that descriptions 
ought to be quantifiers. He says that they are. Kripke doesn’t claim that names ought to be rigid 
designators. He claims that they are. Grice doesn’t claim that people ought to follow the 
cooperative principle. He claims that some people sometimes do (and that if you want to 
exchange information, the maxims of conversation are useful). So (putting aside the problems  
with understanding Mills’ distinction between ideal-descriptive and ideal-idealized models) the 
objection to ideal-idealized models doesn’t work when applied to philosophy of language.9 
 
Mills goes further and argues that ideal-idealized models in political philosophy are ideologies 
that reflect the interests of middle-to-upper-class white males (i.e., people such as John Rawls). 
He says:   
 
Ideal theory, I would contend, is really an ideology, a distortional complex of ideas, 
values, norms, and beliefs that reflects the nonrepresentative interests and experiences 
of a small minority of the national population—middle-to-upper-class white males—
who are hugely over-represented in the professional philosophical population. (2005: 
172) 
  
 8	Just	as	the	goal	of	ethics	is	not	to	guide	our	actions	or	to	make	us	better	people.	It’s	to	understand	the	nature	of	morality	and	justice.		9		We	should	add	that	even	if	there	were	ideal-idealized	models	in	philosophy	of	language,	they	would	have	no	impact	on	whether	we	achieve	the	ideal	because	theories	in	philosophy	of	language	and	linguistics	have	absolutely	no	impact	how	speech	develops	(just	as	political	philosophers	have	no	impact	whatsoever	on	whether	societies	become	more	just	(or,	more	cautiously,	no	more	impact	than	a	butterfly	flapping	its	little	wings).			
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You could try to mimic this as applied to theories of meaning and communication.  
 
Question: Are theories of meaning and communication a distortional complex of ideas, 
values, norms, and beliefs that reflects the nonrepresentative interests and experiences 
of middle-to-upper-class white males who are hugely over-represented among 
philosophers of language and linguists? 
 
Again, we take it the answer here is fairly non-controverersial:  
 
Answer: No. People who are not middle-to-upper-class white males also use names as 
rigid designators, definite descriptions as quantifiers, and when they talk to each other 
they try to be cooperative.  
 
Before we leave Mills behind, we’ll pause for a moment and consider a kind of objection that 
might easily be misunderstood as being aligned with Mills’s.  
 
Possible objection: You keep saying that it’s not just middle-to-upper-class white males 
who use names as rigid designators—all English speakers do. But experimental 
philosophers have given us powerful evidence that non-western cultures don’t use 
names as rigid designators (Machery et al. 2004). Isn’t this exactly the kind of thing that 
Mills had in mind? It shows that the nonrepresentative interests and experiences of 
western academics has distorted core elements of philosophy of language. Doesn’t this 
show that mainstream philosophy of language is idealized in exactly Mills’s sense? 
  
Our reply will summarize core points from above: the kind of concern outlined in the objection 
is exactly the kind of data that our central principle Underexplored is perfectly placed to 
account for. The complaint is that there’s important data that some theorists have overlooked 
and that the reason they have overlooked it is because the majority of theorists have certain 
socio-cultural biases. That happens all the time. Often people will be reluctant to take those 
kinds of objections seriously because it challenges orthodoxy. That’s just an obvious corollary of 
the fact that researchers are human beings with all the accompanying defects. We really don’t 
need to import terminology from moral/political philosophy to describe that.  
 
Talking Stock: Philosophy of Language and the Distinction between Ideal vs Non-Ideal Theory  
 
We have looked at four ways the ideal/non-ideal theory distinction has been drawn by 
influential moral and political philosophers. We have tried to see whether the distinction can be 
extended to illuminate an interesting divide in philosophy of language (between ideal theories 
and non-ideal theories). Our conclusion, in each case, has been that there is no useful 
extension. We suspend judgement about whether it’s a useful distinction in moral and political 
philosophy (though we have to admit we have our doubts), but if it is, that has do with 
peculiarities of those disciplines.  
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With this in mind, let’s consider some authors who explicitly invoke the ideal/non-ideal 
distinction when talking about philosophy of language. The authors of this paper provide a 
good illustration. In the first chapter of Bad Language, for example, Cappelen and Dever 
identify what they call “some idealizations that have guided many of the efforts to theorize 
about natural language, communication, and speakers” (Cappelen and Dever 2019: 1), and 
contrast these idealizations with “tools needed to deal with a decidedly non-ideal world” (1). 
Their list of idealizations includes items such as: 
 
● Conversation and communication are fundamentally cooperative exercises. 
● Speakers say only what they know. 
● A common language has words with stable meanings known to all conversational 
participants. 
 
But “lists of idealizations” of this sort are confused in multiple ways. 
 
● First, as the discussion of the previous section has shown, there is no helpful sense in 
which these are idealizations. Speakers that cooperate or who say what they know, or 
languages with stable word meanings, aren’t in any interesting sense better or more 
properly functioning than speakers or languages that don’t. These are, if anything, 
simplifying assumptions. But simplifying assumptions are all over the place, and don’t 
follow any systematic pattern. Sometimes we simplify by assuming that a body of 
information is common knowledge for the conversational participants—known by all 
the speakers, and known to be known by all the speakers, and so on. At other times we 
simplify by assuming that adjectives are all intersective. And at other times we simplify 
radically by considering a language that contains only a single modal of interest and 
some uninterpreted sentence letters.  
 
● Second, it’s not clear that work in philosophy of language really is making those 
particular simplifying assumptions. It’s certainly true that many formal tools are 
developed to deal with simplified cases—an intersective semantics for adjectives really 
will have trouble dealing with “tall”, and a material conditional semantics for “if” really 
will have trouble dealing with almost all natural language conditionals. But it’s much less 
clear which pieces of theoretical machinery are going to break or misfire when speakers 
aren’t being cooperative or when contextual information isn’t common knowledge. In 
fact, as we’ve noted above, some of the standard tools look like they make exactly the 
right predictions in these cases (no Gricean conversational implicatures result from 
violations of the maxim of quantity when speakers aren’t cooperative; the update 
effects of epistemic modals become non-trivial when contextual information has a non-
S5 structure10). 
 10	“To	say	that	it	is	unclear	what	the	contextual	information	is,	is	to	say	that	different	epistemically	possible	worlds,	different	sets	of	worlds	represent	the	contextual	information.	Thus	not	all	worlds	in	the	context	set	agree	on	what	worlds	are	in	the	context	set,	and	the	accessibility	relation	is	not	S5.	Lewis’s	example	“You	can	put	the	public	interest	first	for	once!”	(Lewis	1979)	is	the	classic	example	of	an	existential	(here,	practical)	
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● And third, even where the simplifying assumptions are being made, they are typically 
being made as steppingstones toward a more sophisticated theory capable of handling 
less simplified data.  
 
3. Is the category ‘social and political philosophy of language’ more helpful?  
 
Our job for this volume was to clarify the distinction between Ideal and Non-Ideal Philosophy of 
Language. We’ve ended up rejecting the distinction. However, maybe there’s another, closely 
related distinction that is useful. This volume has in its title the phrase ‘social and political 
philosophy of language’. What does that category pick out and what is it contrasted with?  
 
At the risk of appearing to be incurable curmudgeons, we are going to also reject that category 
as fairly useless. What could it possibly pick out?  Maybe it’s an attempt to pick out speech by 
people who are politicians or people who talk about political/social topics. If that’s the remit of 
social-political philosophy of language, then it should be concerned with sentences like: 
  
● “We should increase the sale tax on cigarettes because that would give the city more 
money for schools and it could reduce cancer rates.” 
● “The price of parking on city streets should be increased because it is not fair that public 
property should be rented to car owners for very little money.” 
 
That’s what the vast majority of ‘political speech’ is like. It’s just ‘ordinary speech’. It’s not 
special in any way. It doesn’t constitute a distinct subset of speech. The above are just normal 
sentences uttered by normal speakers who have certain interests or have certain jobs. The 
same point applies if the claim is that ‘social and political philosophy of language’ picks out 
words or constructions or speech acts that are politically relevant. The act of saying: “The 
meeting starts on Thursday at 5pm” is politically relevant, if the meeting is about politics, but 
there’s nothing semantically distinctive about the sentence or the act.  
4. A Final Proposal: Two Lists  
 
It turns out to be impossible to find definitions of ‘ideal/non-ideal’ or ‘social and political’ that 
will do useful work in carving out interesting subsets of work in philosophy of language. One 
way to bypass that problem is to just have a list of what people think of as falling into these 
 modal	having	a	non-trivial	update	effect	because	of	lack	of	common	knowledge	of	the	contextual	options.	(Willer	2013)	gives	a	general	model	of	update	effects	of	epistemic	modals	under	conditions	of	contextual	uncertainty	and	shows	how	that	model	captures	many	standard	conversational	uses	of	those	modals;	the	tools	of	Dynamic	Epistemic	Logic	(van	Benthem	2011)	allow	modeling	of	epistemic	updates	in	a	wide	range	of	non-S5	situations	involving	epistemic	interactions	of	agents	under	conditions	of	limited	shared	knowledge.”		
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categories—without asking them to justify or define them. Here’s a conjecture: if you were to 
ask a group of contemporary philosopher of language to produce two lists, one with topics from 
‘social and political or non-ideal philosophy of language’ and one from ‘ideal or not-social-or-
political philosophy of language’, they would probably know what to do and they would end up 
with fairly similar lists: 
 
List 1   
● Slurs, 
● Bullshitting,  
● Lying,  
● Insincerity  
● Silencing 
● Manipulation and propaganda  
● The language of race, gender, and disability  
● Lexical effects  
● Code words  
● Conceptual engineering  
● Generics  
 
List 2   
 
● Rigidity of proper names and natural kind terms 
● Gricean maxims and the production of conversational implicatures 
● De re and de dicto readings of attitude reports 
● Externalism and naturalness in metasemantics 
● Generalized quantifiers 
● Presupposition projection 
● Update conditions of embedded questions 
● Donkey anaphora 
● Indeterminacy of translation and underdetermination of meaning 
● Semantics of vague expressions 
● Lexical semantics 
 
Suppose our conjecture is true: there would, for example, be somewhat broad consensus that 
the topics on List 1 belong in this volume and that the topics on List 2 don’t.11 Suppose also that 
we are right that List 1 topics have no unity. In particular: they don’t share characteristics that 
List 2 topics lack. What are we to conclude from this? At least this: List 1 is a more or less 
random collection of topics with no internal unity that for various hard to understand 
sociological reasons tend to be lumped together. This might seem surprising (and disappointing 
for those who have bought this volume expecting the topics covered to have a certain kind of 
unity). However, it’s not all that unusual. We freely operate with distinctions like ‘analytic vs 
 11	The	conjecture	is	true:	the	topics	on	List	1	are	in	this	volume	and	it	has	gone	through	a	thorough	refereeing	process.		
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continental philosophy’ where there’s also no unity, but whereby some random convention 
philosophers would know how to make lists. Maybe even ‘philosophy’ itself is like that: a list of 
topics with no thematic or methodological unity. More generally, our classifications and 
divisions are often random and lack internal coherence in this way and it’s important to 
emphasize that this doesn’t make topics on the lists less interesting or less worthy of being 
explored.  
 
However, divisions created in these random ways can sometimes have the effect of blinding us 
to important interconnections. In the case of List 1 and List 2, that would be very unfortunate 
because the topics on the two lists are so intimately intertwined. We end with some brief case-
studies that illustrate this.   
 
Case-Study 1: From Kripke to Scorekeeping in a Pornographic Language Game  
 
Consider one historical line of development in philosophy of language. In the 1960s, work by 
Saul Kripke on modal logic and by Arthur Prior on tense logic led to the development of a 
formal toolkit of methods involving truth at an index of evaluation. In the late 1960s, Hans 
Kamp, working with that toolkit, uses data about the temporal and modal indexicals “now” and 
“actually” to motivate extending these methods to a two-dimensional notion of truth relative 
to a pair of indices. David Kaplan then in the early 1970s provides a philosophical setting for the 
formal methods by introducing the character/content distinction and thus allowing for careful 
semantic analysis of context-sensitivity and careful representation of contexts as agent-time-
position-world tuples. Then in the late 1970s, David Lewis in “Scorekeeping in a Language 
Game” generalizes the Kaplanian notion of a context to include such features as commonly 
shared bodies of information, conversationally-licensed permissions, and plans. Lewis’s 
“scorekeeping” picture then gets deployed, in the 1990s and early 2000s, by Langton and West 
in “Scorekeeping in a Pornographic Language Game” and by Mary Kate McGowan in her work 
on oppressive speech to give detailed theoretical stories about particular ways in which the 
structures of language interact with power dynamics in society. 
 
Case-Study 2: Slurs and Race/Gender Terms 
In the 1940s and 1950s, work by W.V.O. Quine and Ruth Barcan Marcus on the interaction 
between modal operators and quantifiers led especially Marcus to an interest in the way that 
modality shapes the best theory of reference. Further considerations along these lines led 
Kripke in Naming and Necessity in 1970 to defend a broadly direct reference view of names via 
a metasemantic mechanism that placed reference fixing in the hands of external causal 
mechanisms. This initial externalist idea in semantics is further developed by Hilary Putnam in 
the early 1970s, and is then given a specifically social development by Burge’s work in the late 
1970s and early 1980s emphasizing the way that the semantic burden of meaning 
determination is distributed across a speech community, rather than being individualized. The 
resulting externalist picture, with its easy accommodation of a speaker alienated from their 
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own conceptual repertoire, is then used by Sally Haslanger in “What Are We Talking About? The 
Semantics and Politics of Social Kinds” to give an account of the meaning of gender and race 
terms that fits with her ameliorative project and by Chris Hom in “The Semantics of Racial 
Epithets” to produce a theory of the normative content of slurs. 
 
Case-Study 3: The Essentializing Effects of Generics  
Bertrand Russell’s investigation of type theory as a solution to the semantic paradoxes leads to 
the development of categorial grammar by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz and the lambda calculus by 
Alonzo Church. These formal tools are then taken up by Richard Montague in the late 1960s 
and very early 1970s. In “The Proper Treatment of Quantification in English”, he uses a rich type 
hierarchy in giving a semantic theory for a fragment of English. The use of higher types in 
Montague semantics then leads to Greg Carlson investigating the semantics of reference to 
kinds in the late 1970s, sparking work on the semantics of generics. Simultaneously, early work 
on the semantics of “donkey pronouns” by Peter Geach and Gareth Evans leads to David 
Lewis’s treatment of adverbs of quantification, which is then put to work in giving 
quantificational analyses of generics. The link between adverbs of quantification and modal 
adverbs then leads to “normal worlds” modal analyses of generics such as Nicholas Asher and 
Michael Morreau’s work in the 1990s. The combination of the modal element and the 
reference to kinds in generics then leads to work by Sally Haslanger and Sarah-Jane Leslie 
exploring the tendency of generic language to give rise to problematic essentializing inferences 
with bad social consequences. 
 
We conclude from these case studies that the divide between List 1 and List 2 doesn’t represent 
a substantial or theoretically interesting divide in the field. There is of course a general 
movement from theories built to handle simple cases to theories that extend those earlier 
theories to handle more complicated cases. The items on List 1 are perhaps in general more 
complicated than the items on List 2 (although the comparative complexity of, for example, 
slurs and donkey pronouns doesn’t seem like a matter than can be easily evaluated), so there is 
perhaps a general tendency for theoretical work to progress from tools crafted in addressing 
List 2 topics to the use and extension of those tools in addressing List 1 topics. But all of this 
theoretical work is being done together, with tools, distinctions, and data being freely passed 
from one topic to another. In philosophy of language, not only does tomorrow not never 
come—it is already here. 
 
Of course, this is not to say that there are not unjustly neglected topics in philosophy of 
language. Surely there are. Philosophy of language is, it’s worth remembering, a young field. A 
bit more than a century old at the most; little more than 50 years old by slightly stricter 
standards. It’s far too early for us even to have the slightest idea what all the important topics 
are, much less for us to have adequately addressed all the topics. But “unjustly neglected” 
doesn’t track anything like a putative ideal/non-ideal philosophy of language distinction, and 
indeed doesn’t look it tracks any interesting distinction (other than perhaps the “hard but 
maybe tractable/just impossibly hard” distinction).  
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 Back	to	work,	then,	everyone	—	there’s	much	to	be	done.		
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